We search for (Nash) implementable solutions on a class of one-to-one matching problems which includes both the housing market (Shapley and Scarf, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1974, 1, 23-28) and marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, American Mathematical Monthly, 1962, 69, 9-15). We show that the core correspondence is implementable. We show, furthermore, that any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable is a supersolution of the core correspondence. That is, the core correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable. A corollary of independent interest in the context of the housing market is that the core correspondence is the only single-valued solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.
Do agents always have the incentive to be truthful about their preferences? Unfortunately, in most contexts it is not an easy task to find a strategy-proof solution that also satisfies some minimal normative properties. ' As far as matching problems are concerned, there are both positive and negative results. Consider the housing market (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) . In this model each agent owns one indivisible good, say a house, and has preferences over the houses held by all agents in the economy. An allocation here is a permutation of the houses among the agents. Roth and Postlewaite (1977) show that the core correspondence is single-valued, and Roth (1982a) shows that it is strategy-proof. Furthermore, Ma (1994) shows that it is the only solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof. Another class of matching problems that has been extensively studied is the class of marriage problems 2 (Gale and Shapley, 1962) .
Here, there are two finite disjoint sets of agents interpreted as a set of men and a set of women. Each man has a preference relation over the set of women and staying single. Similarly, each woman has a preference relation over the set of men and staying single. An allocation is a matching of men and women. Gale and Shapley (1962) show that the core correspondence is well-defined, i.e. the core of each marriage problem is non-empty. Unfortunately, the results concerning strategy-proofness in marriage problems are quite discouraging. Roth (1982b) shows that there is no selection from the core correspondence that is strategy-proof. Moreover, Alcalde and Barberh (1994) show that there is no solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy proof.
Motivated by such different results in two apparently similar class of problems, S~Snmez (1994) introduces the class of generalized matching problems (which include both the marriage problems and the housing market) and studies strategyproofness in this class. He shows that there exists a solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof only if the core correspondence is single-valued. Furthermore, if such a solution exists, it is the core correspondence itself. 3 This result has both positive and negative implications. On the positive side, it provides important non-cooperative support for the core correspondence, which a cooperative solution. Yet, it once again highlights the difficulties in obtaining strategy-proof solutions since often it is not the case that the core correspondence is single-valued. For that reason in this paper we weaken the incentive requirement and ask the following question in the context of generalized matching problems: Is it possible to construct a game form such that at equilib-' Strategy-proofness was first analyzed ia abstract social choice models where there are few or no restrictions on preferences. Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) show that, under minor conditions, strategy-proofness is equivalent to dictatorship, Se~ Spmmont (1995) and Thomson (1994) for recent surveys of the literature on strategy-proofness.
2 See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for an exposition of game-theoretic modelling and analysis of marriage problems and two.sided matching problems in general.
3 SiSnmez (1996) obtains analogous ~esults in the context of many-to-one matching problems.
rium the desired matchings are obtained in spite of the fact that agents may behave strategically? The equilibrium notion we consider is the Nash equilibrium. Using the language of mechanism design, we are searching for (Nash) implementable solutions. 4 Motivated by the negative results of Roth (1982b) and Alcalde and Barberh (1994) , Kara and S~nmez (1996) search for implementable solutions for marriage problems. They show that the core correspondence is implementable. Furthermore, they show that any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable is a supersolution of the core correspondence. That is, the core correspondence is the minimal implementable solution that is Pareto efficient and individually rational, s In this paper we generalize the results of Kara and S~5nmez (1996) to the class of generalized matching problems. A corollary of these general results in the context of the housing market is that the core correspondence is the only single-valued solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.
In this paper we show that we need to consider the core correspondence as a whole as long as we are is interested in implementation of Pareto-efficient and individually rational solutions to generalized matching problems. As a consequence, we also identify the loss entailed in obtaining implementability as well as Pareto efficiency and individual rationality: single-valuedness. We believe these results provide further non-cooperative support to the core correspondence, which is a cooperative solution.
Preliminaries
We divide this section into two subsections. Subsection 2.1 deals with implementation and related concepts in general mechanism design framework. Subsection 2.2 deals with generalized matching problems.
Implementation
The set of alternatives is A. The set of agents is N = {1, 2 ..... n}. For each agent i ~ N, ,-.~'i is the set of possible preference relations. Here each R,. ~,.~ is a complete (for all a, b ~A we have aRib or bRia) and transitive (for all a, b, c ~A we have aRib and bRic implies aRic) binary relation on A. Let
4 See Maskin (1985) , Moore (i 992) . and Thomson (1993) for expositions of implementation theory. 5 See also Alcalde (1996) and M~ (1994) for implementation results in marriage problems via refinements of the Nash equilibrium. A game form is a pair F= (X, h) = (l-lie NXi, h), where X i is agent i's strategy space, and h: X ~ A is an outcome function. The pair (F, R) defines a game. Let NE(F, R) denote the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria for the game (F, R). The game form F implements the solution q~ (in Nash equilibria), if h(NE( F, R)) = ~p(R) for all R ~,9L Maskin (1977) shows that monotonicity ,~s a necessary condition for implementability. He further shows that monotonicity and no veto power together are sufficient for implementability. (See also Williams, 1986, and Saijo, 1988.) Recently there has been a number of studies identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for implementability. Some of these studies are Moore and Repullo (1990) , Dutta and Sen (1991) , SjiSstriSm (1991), Danilov (1992) , and Yamato (1992) . Here we present the results due to Danilov (1992) and Yamato (1992) . 
3R~ E,~,, L( b, R; ) C L(a, R,) and bE tp( R" ).
That is, an alternative b in the lower contour set of R i at a is essential for agent i for ~p if we can find a preference profile R" where any alternative that is strictly better than a under Ri is also better than b under R, and b is selected for the preference profile R ". We denote the set of essential alternatives
then a ~ tp(/~). Thus a solution ~o is essentially monotonic if whenever an alternative a is selected for a preference profile R and it is weakly preferred to all essential elements in L(a, R~) under/~, it is selected for the preference profile R. Danilov (1992) 
Generalized matching problems
A (generalized) matching problem is a triple G = (N, S, R). The first component, N, is a finite set of agents. The second component, S = (Si)~ s, is a list of subsets of N with i ~ S~ for all i ~ N. Here Si represents the set of possible assignments for agent i. The last component, R = (Ri)i~ N, is a list of preference relations. Let P~ denote the strict relation associated with the preference relation R i for all i ~ N. The preference relation R~ of each agent i ~ N is reflexive (for all j ~ S i we have jRij), transitive, and total (for all j, k ~ S i with j ~ k we have jR~k or kR~j, but not both). Such preference relations are referred to as linear orders. Let ~i be the class of linear orders on S~ and ,9P = H i ~ s ~9~. We consider the case where N and S are fixed, and hence to define a matching problem it suffices to specify a preference profile.
A (generalized) matching 11, is a function from the set N into itself such that (1) Vi E N, /z(i) ~ S~, (2) Vi EN, I ;t-'(i)[ = 1. Note that/z is a bijection on N. For all i ~ N, we refer to p,(i) as the assignment of i at /z. We denote the set of all matchings by .//. Let /~t ~" be defined by btt(i)= i for all i E N. We exogenously specify a subset .,4e we of the set of matchings ~ as the set of feasible matchings. We always require that P.t ~.'d' f-In the context of matching problems the set of allocations A is the set of feasible matchings J~f. Given a preference relation R i of an agent i E N, initially defined over S~, we extend it to the set of feasible matchings .,~'f in the following natural way: agent i prefers the matching /.t to the matching p.' if and only if he prefers his assignment under/x to his assignment under p.'. We slightly abuse the notation and also use R~ to denote this extension.
Two extensively studied subclasses of generalized matching problems are the housing market (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) and the marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) . In the housing market, each agent owns one house and has preferences over the houses held by all agents. An allocation is a permutation of the houses among the agents. In the marriage problems, there are two sets of agents: the set of men M and the set of women W. Each man has preferences over the set of women and staying single. Similarly, each woman has preferences over the set of men and staying single. An allocation here is a matching of men and women (where agents may end up being single). If we specify S i = N for all i E N and ./,[r =.,g,, we obtain the housing market as a subclass of generalized matching problems. 
i~(i)R~ l~(i), (3) 3j~ T, tg(j)Pjg(j).
In that case we say the coalition T blocks p. under R. A matching p, ~,t t'f is in the core of the matching problem R ~,gP if it is not dominated by any matching.
We denote the core of R by ~'(R). In the context of matching problems we refer to solutions as matching rules. A matching rule ~p is Pareto efficient if ~(R)c_ ,.~(R) for all R ~,9~', and individually rational if q~(R) _.J(R) for all R ~,9~'.
Results
Throughout this paper we assume that N, S, and .-~f are such that the core is non-empty for all preference profiles. Let ~ be the matching rule which selects the set of matchings in the core for each preference profile. We will refer to the matching rule ~ as the core correspondence. The first proposition concerns the monotonicity of the core correspondence.
Proposition !. The core correspondence is monotonic.
Proof. Suppose ~' is not monotonic. Then there exists R, R E J/' and p. ¢~ fC(R) with L(/~, R i) c_ L( #,, '~i) for all i ~ N but ~, ~ ~'(R). Hence there exists T__. N and ~' ~'r such that
(
We also have /.t'(j)=~ p,(j) and the preferences are strict. Therefore i~(j) Rjl.t(j) implies IZ(j)Pj p.(j) and therefore Remark 1. Theorem I also hold for cases where the core correspondence is not well-defined in the sense that any rule that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable should select all the matchings in the core whenever it is non-empty. One such class of problems is the roommate problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) : there is a group of agents each of whom has strict preferences over all agents. An allocation is a partition of the set of agents into groups of size one and two. Here we assign either one or two persons to a room. We obtain roommate problems as generalized matching problems as follows. Let S~ = N for all i ~ N and .,~f= {/z ~-*f" I ~(/z(i)) = i, for all i ~ N}.
Let us consider the following example: N= {i, j, k}, jP, kP:i, kPjiPjj, iPkjPkk.
Note that in this problem staying single is each agent's last choice and each agent is someone else's first choice. Therefore whoever stays single in a matching will form a coalition to block this matching. Hence W(R) ~-~3. It is straightforward to construct roomate problems with a non-empty core. Theorem 1 shows that if we have any hope of implementing a Pareto-efficient and individually rational matching rule, it is the core and its supersolutions. The next natural question is: Is the core correspondence implementable? The core correspondence is monotonic by Proposition i, yet it does not satisfy no veto power. Hence we need to refer to Danilov (1992) and Yamato (1992) to answer this question. Using the tools developed in these papers we can show that the core correspondence is implementable. Before stating and proving the theorem, we have the fallowing lemma. 
IX(i)R i ~(i) or, equivalently, ~ ~ L( IX, R i) and hence L( I.d, R'i) c_ L( IX, Ri).

This, together with IX ~ W(R'), implies that IX' E E(~', i, L(i, R~)). Therefore L( IX, Ri) ~E(W, i, L( IX, Ri) ).
Relations (5) and (6) Proof. Lemma 1 with monotonicity of the core correspondence (Proposition 1) implies that the core is essentially monotonic. Therefore the core correspondence is implementable, by Yamato (1992) . nQ.E.D.
Remark 2. Kara and S~Snmez (1996) show that the core correspondence is not implementable on the class of marriage problems whenever I N I = 2. As negative results are stronger in smaller classes, this result extends to generalized matching problems.
These results have an interesting implication for the housing market. Proof. Roth and Postlewaite (1977) show that the core correspondence is singlevalued in the context of the housing market. This, together with Theorem I and Theorem 2, implies the desired result, ra Q.E.D.
